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Abstract: In this paper, on the basis of the classifica-

communication

tion of the market and customer, we set the basic as-

E-commercial

sumptions of participant in the EC cooperation. We

E-commerce bring with it great economic increase

take some of the assumptions which were used to

and as well E-commerce play more and more impor-

study grey marketing into the game analysis. And then,

tant

on the basis of the Hotelling model, we argue the co-

E-commerce inevitably face risks, it challenges tradi-

operation strategy choice mechanism between elec-

tional commercial activities, reshape the management

tronic distributors and traditional distributors in the
EC cooperation，explore the benefits and costs of all

and operation of enterprise and people’s attitude as

parties in the alliance, found that it can bring more

The research of E-commerce firstly focuses on

profit and cost advantage of the alliance is an impor-

its concept, mode and model, then the selection of

tant factor to decide whether or not ally with each

applied strategies and application of these strategies.

other.

Among them, the research of E-commerce strategies,

Keyword: Buying Risk; Reliability; E-Commerce;

particularly the channel strategies, mostly focus on

Cooperation Strategy; Hotelling Model

the

role

technology,
transaction

in

economic

the

scale

increase

activities.

of

yearly.

Meanwhile,

well.

choice

between

traditional

channel

and

E-commerce channel or the integration of multiple

1. Introduction

channels. In accordance with the research of Kumar

According to the report of CNNIC (China Internet

(2006) from the angle of producer’s strategies, he

Network Information Centre), till 2011, the number of

studied the reason and mechanism of the addition of

internet user in China is more than 500 million and

e-commerce channel to traditional retail channel.

amount to 513 million. CN-based registration and the

Chiang

number of website amount to 3.53 million and 2.296

e-commercial direct selling channel of suppliers can

million

biggest

increase the profits of suppliers and decrease dual

E-commercial market, the enormous amount of in-

marginalization. Similarly, a lot of researchers sup-

ternet surfers in China is the excellent base for

pose customers have a low utility estimation coeffi-

e-commerce activities. More and more customers
choose the internet for shopping, among all customers

cient for e-commercial product, for instance,
（Fruchter，2005）. Dumrongsiri A（2008）add

in China, E-commerce customer amount to nearly 200

demand uncertainty to Chiang’s utility function to

million.

construct random demand function, then by using of

respectively.

As

the

world’s

With the great development of internet and

(2003)

indicates

the

application

of

newsboy model to analyze the effect of demand uncertainty on producer’s choice of e-commerce direct
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selling and finally indicate a significant relationship
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between demand uncertainty and e-commerce direct
selling. Berstein （2008）indicates the necessity of

e-commercial distribution channel.

application of e-commerce channel in context of oli-

e-commercial mode, due to different customer prefe-

gopoly and further find out the combination of tradi-

rence, customers will balance various preference and

tional channel and e-commerce channel can get a balanced channel structure. Cai G G（2011）researches

conflict. For instance, customer probably prefer high

the effect of channel structure on retailers and the
whole channel. Huang W （ 2009 ） researches the

product is always product of high price, so customer

pricing strategies of single enterprise that based on

pay. In e-commerce situation, customer preference

the addition of e-commerce channel to traditional

may change due to the new transaction situation. For

channel and indicates mixed channel enterprise will

instance, when do online transaction, how can seller

take higher price on e-commerce channel to confront
new enter enterprise. Khouja M （2010）subdivided

optimize online customer’s concerned efficiency, low

customers into customers only consume in traditional

vital importance for formulation of e-commercial

channel and compound customers, and research the

strategies.

Whether in traditional commercial mode or

quality, low price product, actually, high quality
need to balance product quality and price they can

price, risks to attract more online purchasers is of

selection and coordination of three channels, namely,

The author will subdivide the selling channel

producer owned retailing channel, direct selling
channel, and independent channel. Cao W（2010）

and customers in the second part and provide the ba-

studied channel decision problem in context of de-

The third part of this paper will present the me-

mand uncertainty by using of game theory and get the

chanism for formulation of cooperation strategies

balanced channel structure.

between traditional distributors and e-commerce dis-

According to above researches, in most situa-

sic hypothesis.

tributors on the basis of hotelling model.

tions, the application of e-commerce channel no matter for suppliers or retailers, go without saying will

2. Market segmentation and basic Settings

have a positive effect on the increase of competitive

With the increasing uncertainty and personalization of

advantage.

consumer demands, e-commerce markets are increa-

Modern enterprise’s success lies on a new coop-

singly competitive. Consumers have risk preferences

erative relation evolved from antagonism and compe-

rather than rationality when they make decisions about

tition , sometimes we call it strategic alliance (Maloni
and Benton，1997). Cooperation relation is a kind of

buying goods or services. With different risk prefe-

quantization commercial relation build on trust,

different purchasing behaviors, and purchasing beha-

openness, risk sharing and benefit sharing. Coopera-

viors determine e-commerce strategies of companies.

rences and consumption strategies, consumers have

tion relation will bring more commercial benefits to

Previous researchers, such as Smith Wendell

partners than without such relation (Lambert, Em-

(1956), Suzanne Donner (1992), Marcus, Claudio

melhainz & Gardner, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008).

(1998), Verhoef PC and Donkers B (2001), Stanislav

The research of this paper focus on whether or

D. Dobrev (2007), Silvia Sonderegger (2011), and

not the traditional distributors will cooperate or ally

Feng Zhu and Marco Iansit (2012), have classified

with e-commerce distributors when trying to enter

markets and consumers from different angles. This

e-commercial

paper focuses on the distributor cooperation in the

market

or

build

self-owned
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e-commerce environment. Online shoppers enjoy

goods at a lower price through the network reflects

lower price and higher efficiency brought by network

that these consumers are risk-takers who prefer to

channels, but they also face higher risks, such as

save more money. Therefore, the former buyers are

fakes, discrepancies between expectation and reality,

considered as the "risk avoidance" type, and the latter

risks of payment, and price frauds. In contrast, tradi-

is the "risk preference" type (or less risk avoidance).

tional sales have lower risks in spite of higher prices.

Here are the questions to be explored. Will tradi-

Therefore, this paper classifies consumers into two

tional distributors ally with e-commerce distributors

types based on their risk preferences: one prefers to

when they enter into the e-commerce market? If yes,

spend more money and insists on traditional sales for

what are consequences (consumer position and

security, and the other one likes the highly-efficient

chances of survival in the alliance)?

and less-expensive e-shopping.
In this study, we examine the alliance composed
by traditional and electronic distributors. Assume that

3. The Estimating Models of E-commerce
Cooperation

the traditional distributor can obtain a certain product

The electronic distributor E and the traditional dis-

with price advantage and sells it in traditional markets,

tributor T possibly heading for the alliance. Intuitive-

while the electronic distributor only has the advan-

ly, the reason of this alliance is adequate: On the one

tage of selling the product on the internet. In this case,

hand, from the interest of the traditional distributor T

the two types of consumers may change their choices.

with resources of traditional channel, it has to maintain

The former may become online shoppers because the

a low price of the commodity to compete with the

electronic distributor joints in the alliance; and the

electronic distributor which develops fast; Allying

latter may purchase from the traditional distributor

with electronic distributor can avoid such price war, at

for the similar reason.

the same time make more practical interests. On the

Assume that the traditional distributor T and the

other hand, from the interest of the electronic distrib-

electronic distributor E sell the same product and they

utor E which has advantage of electronic channel, it

build an independent alliance J (e.g.: a joint distribu-

faces huge competing pressure from distributors of the

tor), and prices of the product sold by T, E, and J are

same kind; however, allying with the traditional dis-

PT, PE, and PJ, respectively. Obviously, the price

tributor can gain resources of particular products in

relationship is as follows: PE  PJ  PT .

competition, improving brand and scale of its own

To control other conditions, this paper supposes
that products sold by both distributors are exactly the

electronic channels, and a beneficial stance while
competing with the distributors of the same kind.

same without structural or functional difference and

Now, we will analysis the detailed mechanisms

differences between traditional and e-commerce distributors are risks and prices during the purchase

formulating these two main reasons.
① The willing and limits of alliance for the traditional

process. In this paper, the reliability of purchasing

distributor

goods is set to R, which varies in different channels.

In the analysis above, the electronic distributor E

The behavior of purchasing goods at a higher price

and traditional distributor T, separately has stable

through traditional distributors reflects that these

market position in electronic and traditional sales

consumers prefer to pursue reliability at a higher cost,

market. Now we assume that there is another tradi-

lowering purchase risks; the behavior of purchasing

tional distributor T1 beside T, and T1 and T have the
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same resource advantage in traditional channel mar-

1） Do it alone

ket. The electronic distributor E frequently seeks op-

The traditional distributor T explores market

portunity allying with T or T1 for its motivation to

alone, the environment of competition it may face

develop. Besides, the electronic distributor E has

are:
A. the traditional distributor T1 and the elec-

access to purchase similarly reliable products provid-

tronic distributor E each explore the market alone

ing by T or T1 in the market.
Under these assumptions, there are three distrib-

In this situation, the electronic distributor E oc-

utors taking part into the competing game in the

cupies the electronic sales market, the traditional dis-

market: the electronic distributor E, the traditional

tributor T and T1 divide the traditional sales market

distributor T and T1. The electronic distributor E has a

equally. The electronic distributor E imports products

stable stance in electronic sales market; but the tradi-

alone (from upstream market), which may lead to

tional distributor T and T1 will probably individually

high-priced cost. It may be expelled from the market

take half of the traditional sales market (if they are

by T or T1 using low price. So it is unbelievable

evenly matched). At this point, the traditional distrib-

threat.
B. the electronic distributor E and traditional

utor T has several strategies to choose from as fol-

distributor T1 build strategic alliance J1

lowed:

PhR

Price P and cost C

Ph

PlR
Pl

P0

CER

CE

CJR
CTR
CT0
CJ0
CE0

CT and CT1

R*

R0
Reliability R

Picture3.1 games between alliance and do alone
The cost that J1 (may assumed as a joint venture

fore, driven by the benefit of parent company, J1 has

or franchise) sells particular products lies between E

the possibility to exist.

and T selling the same products. Seemingly T could
use low-price to expel J1 from the electronic sales

Concretely, Picture 3.1 could be used to describe
the condition of J1.As it shows in Picture 3.1，the

market. However, in fact, T1 and E, which are the

horizontal axis represents reliability of purchasing

parent companies of J1, can obtain profits and oppor-

products, and the vertical axis shows the price and

tunity of expanding scale from cooperation. There-

cost. The traditional distributor T has a higher initial
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cost, yet gets little increase on cost due to stable

lievable threat that T provokes a cannibalization price

supply of goods when providing products through

war. On the contrary, on the condition of inexistence

electronic market; The electronic distributor E has a

of a cannibalization price war, it is beneficial to all

comparatively low cost through electronic market,

parties.

but it will has a surging cost if it sells new products

There is a question remaining, why T1 want to

which has no stable supply. In addition, consumers

ally with E, other than pursuing cost advantage of

are divided into two parts: high risk aversion and low

highly internalization of building individual proprie-

risk aversion. Ph curve in Picture 3.1 represents price

torship? We will leave the question to be settled in

curve of consumers who prefer to spend a higher cost

following text.

(price) to get reliable guarantees; Pl curve is price

2) Ally with T1

curve of those who will pay less (lower prices) for
equal reliability guarantees（Khai Sheang Lee，2007）.

and avoid vicious competition when T and T1 make

According to the theory of Dunning (J. H. Dun-

an alliance organization. However, according to the

ning, 2001), it could save more transaction cost when

current partition of the market, T and T1 still share the

transnational distributor increases the level of inter-

traditional sales market.

nalization. Hence, the cost that firms of alliance sale a

3) Ally with the electronic distributor E

It will contribute to coordinate their behavior

certain product through traditional channel is higher

Explanation to the question also settles the re-

than T, but lower than T when sale product through

maining question above, which is why T1 want to ally

electronic channel due to the electronic distributor

with E?
To solve the question, Picture 3.2 is used to analyze market conditions. In Picture 3.1, the vertical
axis represents price and cost, the horizontal axis
represents performance of products. The difference
between picture 3.2 and picture 3.1 is the meaning of
the horizontal axis, the purpose of doing that is convenient to further divided the customers.

(here assumed that Along with the product purchase
reliability reducing, the sales status of alliance tending to the electronic distributors’ sales situation).
From Picture 3.1, relying on the cost advantage
of highly internalization of individual proprietorship,
the traditional distributor T can bring price down to
(CJR -ε)(εis a small positive number), which could
expel alliance J1 which was established by the elec-

As shown in the picture 3.2, when the coopera-

tronic distributor E and the traditional distributor T1

tion project has both market potential and profits

from E-sales market. But it will be revenged by E and
T1. On the one hand, the traditional distributor T1 has

space, on one hand, the potential customers are
enough；on the other hand, the price curve (Ph and Pl)

the same cost curve as T, and it may merge J1 when

lies above the cost curve (CE，CJ，CT and CT1), we

necessarily, falling into a cannibalization price war

can subdivide the customers according to the interac-

against T. It is mire which T and T1 don’t want to fall

tive relationship between distributors and the cus-

into. On the other hand, facing price attack of T and

tomers. Table 3.2 shows four typical customer types.

being unable to gain benefit from alliance, the elec-

In table 3.1, type I customer would pay higher

tronic distributor E would protect t E-sales market,

price for the pursuit of high purchasing efficiency,

use the low-price of (CF0 -ε) to compete for custom-

and its low risk aversion characteristics, making it

ers against T, and give active support to T1 to merge

does not pay attention to the reliability of the pur-

J1. Therefore, for a rational participator, it is unbe-

chase. Hence he is the relier of the traditional distributor that we discuss in this paper. The reason why he
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buys products from joint venture or other forms al-

type Ⅰ and type Ⅳ consumer are stable relier for

liance is his trust towards the traditional distributor.

traditional distributor and Electronic distributor ac-

Type II customer also pursues high purchasing efficiency，but they have high reliability requirement, in

cordingly, so, the competition between distributors, in
essence is the pursuit of type Ⅱ and type Ⅲ pro-

order to avoid the risk of purchase. Type III customer

ducer. In fact, the four types of consumer is barely

doesn’t pursue high purchasing efficiency, However,
because of low risk aversion，the price has significant

one abstract of the real consumer and it can regarded

effects on his purchase behavior. He always expects

distributors, and the real distributors can be one type

to gain higher purchasing efficiency with lower price.

of them or the combination of any type of them. So,
regarded the type Ⅱ and type Ⅲ consumers pursuit

as four types of typical representations of the real

Type IV also doesn’t pursue high purchasing efficiency，but its high risk aversion characteristics,

by distributors, we can imagine their characteristics to

making it pay more attention to the reliability of the

be very complicate. For instance, in "risk averse" de-

purchase. Hence he is the relier of the electronic dis-

gree, there may have many states from high to low; in

tributor that we discuss in this paper. The reason why

the reliability of purchase, may also have many states

he buys products from joint venture or other forms

from high to low. In this way, we can use the follow-

alliance is his trust towards the electronic distributor.

ing method to analyses.

According to situation mentioned above, for

Price P and cost C

Ph
Pl
CEPE

CE

P0

CJ
CT0

CJPE
CTPE

CT and CT1

CJ0
CE0

PE*

PE
Purchase efficiency PE

Picture 3.2 classification of consumers
Table 3.1 typical type of potential customers
Low risk aversion

High risk aversion

High purchasing efficiency

I

II

Low purchasing efficiency

III

IV

In order to compare different situations, we first

is a products which can be sold through traditional

analyze the situation without alliance. Suppose there

channel and electronic channel, the probability of risk
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that the consumers purchase products from T and T1

According to that, we generalize the distribution

f
are T ，the probability of risk that the consumers
f
purchase products from E is E. Do not lose the gene-

proposition in equation (3.1),that is, consumer’s pre-

f

f

rality, suppose T =0, 0< E<1；The loss of consumer is
W. We suppose consumers’ preference of purchasing

f

reliability distributed evenly in [0， E], if we suppose
there is no difference between consumers’ purchase
of products from T(T1) or E, and the preference of
purchasing reliability of consumers is
f  f * , 0  f *  fE ,

ference of purchasing reliability distributed evenly in
range of［0，fM］, so , the profit of E is

 E  ( PE  C E )

fM  f *
fM

(3.3)

The total profit of the firm who sale products
through traditional channel (including T and T1) are:

 2T  ( PT  CT )

f*
fM

(3.4)

Put equation (3.2) into equation (3.3) and equa-

So,
( f E  f * )W  PE  PT

tion (3.4), we get the first order condition of profits
(3.1)

We can explain the meaning of equation (3.1) as
follows: on the left side of the equation is the purchaser surplus decrease due to consumer purchase

f  f

E ) comproducts through electronic channel(
*
f  f  f E , however, we omit the purpared to

chasing product price when f  f , on the right side
*

of the equation is the purchaser surplus decrease
caused by consumer purchase products through tradi-

f  fT  0 ）rather than f  f * , we
*
omit the product price when purchase f  f as well.
tional channel（

On base of equation (3.1), we conclude
P  PE
f *  fE  T
W

(3.2)

Obviously, if the consumer’s require of pur*
chasing reliability is f  f , the optional purchase

object is the product sold by Tor T1. Suppose

f M  f E is the maximum the probability of risk

maximum

 E
1

( fMW  fEW  PT  2PE  CE )  0
PE fMW

(3.5)

 2 T
1

( f EW  2 PT  PE  CT )  0
PT
fMW

(3.6)

Solve equation (3.5) and (3.6); we get the Nash
equilibrium price
1
PEm  ((2 f M  f E )W  C T  2 C E )
(3.7)
3
1
PTm  (( f M  f E )W  2 C T  C E )
(3.8)
3
Put equation (3.7) and (3.8) to equation (3.3) and
(3.4) respectively, consolidate that with equation (3.2),
we get the profits under equilibrium condition:
 Em 
 2mT 

1
( 2 f M W  f EW  C T  C E ) 2
9 fMW
1
9 fM W

( f M W  f EW  C T  C E ) 2

(3.9)
(3.10)

So, under the proposition of evenly distributed
the probability of risk of consumer, both profits of

accepted by consumer, so , any consumer can only
purchase products in the range of [0，fM], otherwise

traditional distributor and electronic distributor are

there is no corresponding consumer. Obviously, for

mutual profits of traditional distributor T and T 1 ,

consumer

is

due to the same situation of T and T 1 , any consumer

f  f  f M , t the optional purchase object is the

make no difference purchase between T and T1 , thus,

product sold by E. So, the question we researched is

we can conclude the equilibrium profits of T equals to

require

the

probability

of

risk

*

just a price question by Hotelling price game theory.

less than zero. Among them, equation(3.10)is the

that of T 1 , that is

E-Commerce Cooperation Strategy Research
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1 m
1
( f M W  f EW  C T  C E ) 2
 2T 
2
18 f M W

(3.11)

product is
PTm1 

1
(( f M  f J )W  2 C T 1  C J )
3

(3.13)

In above analysis, equilibrium price equation
(3.7) and (3.8) indentify, the higher the probability of

In the above two equations, CT1 is unit cost of

f
risk Eof electronic distributor, the lower the equili-

product in T1, CJ is the unit cost of J’s product. We

m
E

P , and the higher equilibrium price of
traditional distributor’s product. It is asserted keep
other conditions unchanged, the higher the probability of risk of electronic distributor, the more detrimental to electronic distributor’s market place keeping, on the contrary, strengthen their counterparty’ s
market position. This conclusion conforms to our
intuition. In fact, from equilibrium profit equation
(3.9) and (3.10) we can get the similar conclusion: the
higher the probability of risk of electronic distributor

can see equation (3.12) and (3.13) respectively ana-

fE, the lower the profit  Lm , however, the competi-

structure as well analogous to equation (3.9) and

brium price

m
tor’s (traditional distributor) profits  F becomes

logous to equation (3.7) and (3.9).

The Nash equili-

brium price of T1 and J by Hotelling model analysis
is:
1

 Jm 
 Tm1

(2 f M W  f JW  CT 1  C J )2
9 fMW
1

( f M W  f JW  CT 1  C J )2
9 fMW

In the above two equations,
profits,

(3.14)
(3.15)

 Jm is alliance J’s

 Tm1 is traditional distributor T1’s profits, the

(3.10).
Now the question is: how electronic distributors

higher. Secondly, if market demand-based maximum

E and traditional distributors T to allocate alliance

probability of risk f M increases, all consumers

profits

benefit, it indicates market condition relaxing is
beneficial to all manufacturer；Thirdly, consumers’
profits are negatively related to its costs, while positively related to competitor’s costs.
Now, we study the situation that T and E establish an alliance. Here, we regard the alliance between
T and E as an independent enterprise J; we conduct
Hotelling price game theory analysis to J and T1.
Thus, we deal with research questions with the same
methods used above. Suppose the probability of risk
of alliance enterprise J’s products satisfy following
conditions:

0  fT 1  f J  f E  f M , fT1 is the

probability of risk of T1, accordance with Hotelling
price theory, the equilibrium product price of enterprise J is
1
PJm  ((2 f M  f J )W  C T 1  2 C J )
(3.12)
3
Equilibrium price of traditional distributor’s
(ventures exclusively with the high-end investment)

 Jm . For convenience, here using "profitabili-

ty" as criteria (Guidelines of the "profitability" is one
of the common assumption of the distribution of benefits of the alliance, the actual principle of interests
distribution of the alliance is often just close to these
guidelines, or criteria; In addition, environmental
change, organizational culture and characteristics of
decision-makers will have an impact on the distribution of benefits) to divide the alliance gains (Farok J
Contractor and Wonchan Ra, 2000). According to this
rule, the share of the profits of one partners of alliance depends on the ratio of its own profit ability in
total profit ability. Therefore, the profits that electronic distributors get from the alliance are:

 JL 

 Lm
 Jm
m
m
L F

(3.16)

And the profits that traditional distributors get
from the alliance are:
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 JF

 Fm
 m
 Jm
m
L F

(3.17)

The above two equations are determined by
(3.11) and (3.9).
In the above analysis, the profit value, such as

of ally with the electronic distributors. Traditional
distributors enter into the electronic sales through
cooperation with the traditional distributors; with relatively low cost opened the electronic sales market.
And electronic distributors ally with the traditional

equation (3.9), equation (3.10) (3.11) and (3.14) (3.15)

distributors, although the competition may aggravate,

and (3.16) and (3.17).Show that the profits not only

but really get a stable source of product, reduce the

related to the product failure rate of competitive par-

cost and improve the profit, and also may improve its

ties, but also more sensitive to differences of the cost;

original electronic sales network scale and brand ef-

For example, the difference between CF and CL in

fect.

equation (3.9) and the difference between CF1 and CJ

To analyze the specific mechanism of alliance

in equation (3.14) have a greater impact on profits.

cooperation, on the basis of Hotelling price competi-

Therefore, it can bring the cost advantage is the im-

tion game between traditional distributors and elec-

portant factors to decide whether ally with each other

tronic distributors, we argue the cooperation strategy

or not.

choice mechanism between electronic distributors
and traditional distributors in the EC cooperation，

Above result of cooperative or uncooperative
Hotelling price competition game between traditional
distributors and electronic distributors indicate that，

explore the benefits and costs of all parties in the al-

there may be "win-win" alliance program which

advantage of the alliance is an important factor to

beneficial to both partners.

decide whether or not ally with each other.

4. Conclusion
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